Imagine a scenario in which an interest group is so influential that it has already gotten most of what it wants, such that further policy change in its favor is unlikely. Of course not. The states each have a different set of policies on abortion and auto emissions.
Local governments have thousands of different law enforcement policies and education policies. Some researchers have begun to take this approach , and their studies do uncover evidence of interest group influence.
The main challenge, as with almost all work on subnational government, is data availability. Oftentimes this kind of work requires the collection of entirely new data—both on interest group activity and public policy. But that is both a challenge and an opportunity. And given the potential for subnational research to revive the study of interest group influence, it is a challenge well worth taking on.
Please read our comments policy before commenting. Click here to cancel reply. Facebook Facebook. Despite the narrative of big campaign spenders and lobbyists controlling politics in the United States, interest group strength comes from having legislative allies setting the policy agenda.
In fact, it is likely that contributions are often defensive. If groups are most influential where they spend the most, one might assume that the NRA spends the most in conservative, pro-gun states. In fact, according to National Institute on Money in Politics , the group spends the most in battleground and blue states, such as Colorado, Washington, California, and Nevada.
This is likely because the group already has the ability to set the agenda in the most conservative states through a large number of allies in the legislature and instead focuses funds where its influence is more tenuous. Scholars and pundits should take heed that what often appears to be the origin of interest group strength may in fact reflect defensiveness or be supplementary to what is the real source of power — having allies setting the agenda. Please read our comments policy before commenting.
Leslie K. Finger — Harvard University Leslie K. Finger is a lecturer on government and social studies at Harvard University. Her research focuses on interest group influence and the politics of education.
Click here to cancel reply. Facebook Facebook. If these large corporations were to suddenly become less successful, it might create economic trouble, which could turn public opinion against elected officials. Thus, the wealthier a corporation is, the more political clout it tends to have. Likewise, large corporations have greater access to politicians than other groups, because corporate leaders often have insider status in powerful groups.
Moreover, an interest group might also make use of financial resources in order to donate to a political campaign. In this instance, the donation is not explicitly tied to a policy vote, and is therefore a legal contribution. That being said, the expectation is that interest groups will use their wealth to elect candidates that support their issues. In all of these ways, interest groups use money to gain success and influence on many levels.
Apart from using money to directly influence bureaucrats, interest groups may also use their wealth to launch issue campaigns. In this case, organizations try to gain popular support among American voters for a particular issue.
Ultimately, the goal of this tactic is to pressure legislators into acting a certain way in response to a perceived public mandate. Since legislators are elected, there is a strong incentive for them to vote for issues that are popular with the current public opinion.
Media campaigns can be very effective at marshaling public opinion, but they are very expensive, because campaigns need to buy television and radio air time, as well as print advertisements. Money is also required to hire and fund the professionals who will run these campaigns. Thus, interest groups with greater funds are far more likely to successfully influence policy than those groups with fewer financial resources.
As organizations attempting to influence politics through public opinion, interest groups with larger memberships have an advantage over smaller ones. Since legislators are accountable to voters, the more public support there is for an issue, the more likely it is to receive support and governmental attention.
Larger interest groups necessarily have influence because of how many voters participate in them. They are also effective because the core group membership is able to more effectively campaign on behalf of an issue than a group with a smaller membership. Additionally, larger interest groups are able to stage large demonstrations that make visible the widespread support for an issue.
Interest groups often rely on leaders to organize their fundraising and make their advocacy efforts successful. Differentiate between the different kinds of leadership structures in interest groups and social movements. The role of leadership varies based on the political orientation or goals of an interest group.
Some interest groups, especially corporations, hire lobbyiststo lead their advocacy efforts. Interest groups with organized media campaigns may be led by political strategists. In contrast, more amorphous social movements that act as interest groups may coalesce around charismatic, but often unofficial, group leaders. When interest groups attempt to influence policymakers through lobbying, they usually rely on professional lobbyists.
Lobbyists are often well-connected professionals, such as lawyers, whose role is to argue for specific legislation. Successful lobbyists achieve insider status in legislative bodies, meaning they can talk directly to lawmakers. Recent estimates put the number of registered lobbyists in Washington, D. Interest groups that attempt to influence policy by changing public opinion may be led by political strategists, who are often consultants familiar with public relations, advertising, and the political process.
Political strategists are responsible for determining a campaign plan. The campaign plan usually involves deciding on a central message the interest group hopes to use for persuading voters to support their position. Additionally, the strategist determines where advertisements will be placed, where grassroots organizing efforts will be focused, and how fundraising will be structured. In issue-based campaigns, successful political strategists create public awareness and support for an issue, which can then pressure legislators to act in favor of the interest group.
Interest groups may be broader than one formal organization, in which case advocacy may form a social movement. A social movement is group action aimed at social change.
See also Grossman and Helpman See also Krishna and Morgan and Visser and Swank This is the most relevant environment to investigate how the relative strength of parties affects decisions.
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